






     Principles in collision:  





Arbitrator and mediator in Oakland, California. 
Adjunct law school faculty of the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of 
Michigan 
 
In 1956, hundreds of textile workers lost their jobs at the Darlington Manufacturing Company 
when the employer closed its plant immediately after the workers voted to unionize.  Nine years 
later, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decided that the company was free to close the business 
even if it was motivated by anti-union hostility.1 Few cases in U.S. legal history so sharply 
illuminate the colliding interests of workers seeking to unionize, and owners seeking to avoid 
unionization. 
 
Darlington Manufacturing Company was a textile maker in South Carolina.  The corporation was 
part of an interlocking web of nearly two dozen corporations in the textile industry that were 
controlled by the Milliken family.  The Textile Workers Union began an organizing drive at the 
Darlington plant early in 1956, hoping to expand its base.  In the preceding decade, many 
companies in the industry transferred textile mills from the widely unionized New England area 
in the Northeastern U.S., to the mostly non-union Southeast.   
 
The company resisted the union’s organizing drive.  However, the company lost an election for 
union representation in September 1956.  Within days, Darlington’s board of directors decided to 
liquidate the corporation.  Plant operations ended in November, and the equipment and 
machinery were sold by December.  Over 500 workers lost their jobs.  The small mill town in 
which the plant was located was devastated. 
 
Based on unfair labor practice charges filed by the union, a complaint was issued by the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  The NLRB is the agency that oversees enforcement of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a statute passed by the U.S. Congress in 1935.  The 
NLRA was intended to authorize and protect union organizational activity in the private sector of 
the U.S. economy.2  
 
As relevant here, after an administrative hearing the NLRB concluded that the company violated 
                                                 
1 Textile Workers. Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).  The facts recited in this 
article are drawn from the Supreme Court’s opinion, and from other decisions related to the dispute.  Previous 
rulings can be found at: 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963), and 139 NLRB 241 (1962). 





Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.3 In addition, the NLRB determined that the 
corporation was part of a single, integrated enterprise.  Alternatively, the Board stated that the 
plant closure was part of the larger business, and was done for discriminatory reasons. 
 
The NLRB’s remedy did not include an order, as proposed by the union, that the enterprise be 
reopened and jobs restored.  Instead, the NLRB directed that the former employees be paid what 
they would have earned, until equivalent employment was found.  The NLRB also ordered that 
employees be given preferential hiring status at other plants within the far-flung Milliken domain.    
 
The company resisted the NLRB’s order, and sought appellate review.  An intermediate court of 
appeals declined to enforce the NLRB’s decision.  The appellate court determined that an 
employer has a right to close all or part of its business, even if anti-union hostility is the cause. 
 
On review, the unanimous ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “an employer has the 
absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases.”4 The court cautioned, 
however, that an employer cannot close part of its business, “if motivated by a purpose to chill 
unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer may 
reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect.”5  
 
Ever since, the juxtaposition of these reasons has prompted labor law analysts to express concern 
about the logic of the court’s decision.  Regarding the issue of interference with employee rights 
under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, the court asserted that the closing of an entire plant is one of 
those employer decisions that, “are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they 
would never constitute a violation of 8(a)(1), whether or not they involved sound business 
judgment....”6 In a footnote to this portion of the case, the court argued that, “the ambiguous act 
of closing a plant following the election of a union is not, absent an inquiry into the employer’s 
motive, inherently discriminatory.”7 
 
Considering the issue of alleged discrimination under Section 8(a)(3), the court acknowledged the 
NLRB’s factual finding that the company’s action was based on its goal of avoiding a union at 
the plant.  Regardless, the court reasoned that, “[A] proposition that a single businessman cannot 
choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it 
should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal 
                                                 
3 The provisions at issue are the following: 
Sec. 8 (a).  It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7;.... 
..... 
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage 
or discourage membership in any labor organization. 
4 Darlington, supra, 380 U.S. at 268. 
5 Id., 380 U.S. at 275. 
6 Id., 380 U.S. at 269. 







judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act.”8 
 
In assessing legislative and judicial history, the court found that neither supported the NLRB’s 
ruling.  In the court’s view, the legislative history was silent, and prior judicial decisions were 
construed as generally supporting an employer’s right to permanently go out of business.  In this 
respect, the court likened a plant closure to a group of employees deciding, en masse, to quit 
working for the same employer. 
 
The court’s reasoning distinguished the facts in Darlington from the case of a “runaway shop” 
designed to evade an employer’s duty to bargain after a union has been chosen by employees.  
Compared to the “runaway” situation, “a complete liquidation of a business yields no such future 
benefit.”9 Even if the employer, “may be motivated more by spite against the union than by 
business reasons...it is not the type of discrimination which is prohibited by the Act.”10 
 
Turning to the question of whether the shutdown by Darlington was only a partial closing of a 
larger business, the court remanded the case for further deliberation.  In doing so, the court 
explained that the “repercussions” on the remainder of the business could give rise to an unfair 
labor practice violation, if the closure was done to chill union activity elsewhere, and that such an 
outcome was reasonably foreseeable.11 
 
After the case was remanded for further findings of fact, the NLRB ruled against the company.  
In 1968, the court of appeals upheld the order.12 Despite this action, years remained before the 
matter was resolved.  A settlement reached in 1980, 24 years after the saga began, resulted in 
$5.0 million being paid to Darlington workers or their estates.  Many workers died in the interim.  
One employee attending the meeting to decide if the settlement should be approved is quoted as 
saying that the delay was caused by, “bureaucratic red taping and winding through the loopholes 
in the labor laws.”13  
 
The Darlington decision has been criticized by practitioners and scholars, with several principal 
points being made.14  
                                                 
8 Id., 380 U.S. at 270. 
9 Id., 380 at 272 
10 Id. 
11 Id., 380 U.S. at 274-275. 
12 Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968). 
13 105 Lab.Rel.Rptr. 320 (1980). 
14 See, e.g., Ray, Sharpe & Strassfeld, Understanding Labor Law (2d ed., 2005), pp. 102-105; Gorman and Finkin, 
Basic Text on Labor Law (2d ed., 2004), pp. 170-174, 448-451; Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate 
Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 73, 96-102 (1988); Atleson, Values 
and Assumptions in American Labor Law, pp. 138-142 (1983); Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 
Term, 75 Yale L.K. 59, 64-67 (1965); Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor 
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 Yale L.J. 1269, 1323-24 (1968).  A comment in the 






First, the extended delay in resolving the dispute compounded the injury to the workers who were 
terminated, and to the small town affected by the closure.  Justice delayed not only meant that 
justice was long denied for individual workers, but the extended process brought discredit upon 
the federal agency, no matter how worthy its goals.   
 
Second, the court’s analysis on the issue of an employer’s plant closure seemed to turn the NLRA 
on its head.  Legislation designed to grant and protect the right to unionize was, instead, 
construed to permit an employer to penalize those same workers with impunity.  Despite the 
language of the NLRA prohibiting specific misconduct, the employer in Darlington was given 
leave to ignore the terms of the statute by relying on an implied right for an employer to close its 
doors, a subject about which the text of the NLRA is silent. 
 
Third, instead of examining the facts in terms of whether the employer was retaliating for a 
unionization vote at Darlington, a question at the heart of the statutory structure, the court 
imported a different perspective; that is, whether the employer stood to benefit in the future by its 
action.  The comparison to workers having the freedom to leave their jobs en masse, even if not 
to their benefit, overlooked both the extreme unlikelihood of such an event in a poor community, 
and the explicit statutory prohibition that employers cannot, by discrimination, discourage 
employees in their exercise of rights under the NLRA. 
 
Fourth, by shifting the focus to employees at other plants, the court made protection of the rights 
of Darlington’s workers dependent on the rights of employees at other company facilities.  Had 
the ultimate ruling been that a chilling effect was not proven, the Darlington employees would 
have been denied any amount as an award for their lost jobs. 
 
Last, even without an order to compel reopening of the plant because of the practical difficulty of 
overseeing a private employer’s operations, the court’s decision falls short.  The deterrent value 
of the law to avoid similar, future misconduct was severely undermined by the court’s rejection 
of meaningful monetary remedies to compensate employees, at least partially, for losses suffered.  
The NLRB’s original remedy awarding make whole relief and continued pay until substitute 
employment was obtained, coupled with preferential transfer rights, provided an incentive for the 
employer to act responsibly and quickly.  This would have been a more satisfactory remedy, even 
without a plant reopening, than the prospect of no remedy at all.  In effect, the court’s decision 
placed the entire risk of loss on employees at the Darlington plant, subject to vagaries of proof 
about the intended goal of the closure as to employees elsewhere. 
 
The harsh outcome of the Darlington decision has been partially limited because of its narrow 
                                                                                                                                                              
violation of Sectin 8(a)(3),” and failed to take proper account of the “discouragement” phrase in the statue.  
(Comment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 197-199 (1965).) Nevertheless, the analyst concluded that the court’s focus on future 
benefit, and the lack thereof for Darlington, supported a doctrine consistent with the “free withdrawal of capital from 







facts, which deal with an employer’s prerogative to close an entire plant, even if motivated by 
hostility toward the union.  In other instances, specific findings of anti-union intent continue to 
matter, including, for example, for disputes over runaway shops, partial closings, transfers of 
work, and subcontracting of operations.15 When an employer’s anti-union intent is demonstrated, 
not an easy task in most cases, remedies assisting those who are displaced or victimized can 
issue, although often subject to constraints based on the economic burdens that are imposed on an 
employer.16  Still, in the final analysis, an employer’s leeway to permanently close its operations 
- proverbially, to “take the money and run” - can be a powerful disincentive to workers relying on 
their legal right to unionize. 
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15 For more recent examples, see Naperville Ready Mix, Inc., 242 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2001);  Dorsey Trailers, Inc. V. 
NLRB, 233 F.3d 831 (4th Cir. 2000); Reno Hilton Resorts v. NLRB, 196 F.3d 1275 (D.C . Cir. 1999); NLRB v. Joy 
Recovery Technology Corp., 134 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1998); Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1985); 
Purolator Armored v. NLRB, 764 F.2d 1423 (llth Cir. 1985); Big Bear Supermarkets, 640 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NRLB, 578 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978); also see  ILGWU v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 
374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
16 Id.; also see Coronet Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 158 F.3d 782 (4th Cir. 1998); Lear Siegler, Inc., 295 NLRB 857 (1989). 
